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INTRODUCTION

When Teena Brandon ("Brandon") left Lincoln, Nebraska, for Richardson County, Nebraska, in November 1993, little did she know of
the events that would unfold during the 1993 holiday season. First,
Brandon would be beaten and raped by two male acquaintances, John
L. Lotter ("Lotter") and Thomas M. Nissen ("Nissen"), on early Christmas Day.1 Then, after reporting the rapes to the authorities, Brandon
would endure a long and grueling investigative interview conducted
by Richardson County Sheriff Charles B. Laux ("Laux"), during which
Laux would use insensitive, if not utterly vulgar, language and would
ask Brandon questions which he would later admit were entirely irrelevant to whether Brandon had been raped. Finally, on December 31,
1993, Brandon and two of her friends would be found murdered in a
rural Humboldt, Nebraska, farmhouse in Richardson County.2 Lotter
and Nissen would later be charged with and convicted of murdering
Brandon and her two friends.3
After Brandon's murder, JoAnn Brandon, Brandon's mother and
personal representative of Brandon's estate, brought suit against
Richardson County and Laux, alleging wrongful death, negligence in
failing to protect Brandon, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") inflicted on Brandon prior to her murder.4 This Note
1. Nissen was also known as Marvin T. Nissen. On December 31, 1993, Lotter and
Nissen were arrested for the December 25, 1993 sexual assaults on Brandon.
Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. County of Richardson, 261 Neb. 636, 646,
624 N.W.2d 604, 614 (2001).
2. Afraid that Lotter and Nissen would find and kill her because she reported the
rapes to law enforcement authorities, Brandon decided to stay with a friend
whose house was located in rural Richardson County. Apparently, Brandon believed that Lotter and Nissen did not know the location of the house. Id.
3. See State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), modified, 255 Neb. 889,
587 N.W.2d 673 (1999); State v. Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 560 N.W.2d 157 (1997).
4. The procedure leading up to Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. County of Richardson came to be quite lengthy. Originally, JoAnn Brandon made a claim pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-901 to
13-926 (Reissue 1997, Cum. Supp. 2002). The six-month period for Richardson
County and Laux to respond to the claim expired without a response. Under the
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act a civil suit is permitted after the sixmonth period has elapsed. Id. § 13-906 (Reissue 1997). As such, JoAnn Brandon
withdrew her claim and filed a petition seeking damages for the wrongful death
of Brandon and for Brandon's pre-death injuries and damages. In response, Richardson County and Laux filed a demurrer, which the district court sustained.
JoAnn Brandon then filed an amended petition, adding the IIED claim, which
was based on how Laux conducted himself toward Brandon prior to her death. At
this point, the only allegation regarding the emotional distress claim was that
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discusses only the IIED claim, which was based on Laux's conduct toward Brandon on December 25, 1993 when he interviewed her about
the reported rapes. In short, JoAnn Brandon alleged that Laux's conduct toward her daughter throughout the course of the investigative
interview was "extreme and outrageous." In Brandon ex rel. Estate of
5
Brandon v. County of Richardson, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
toward Brandon was "extreme
conduct
agreed and held that Laux's
6
and outrageous" as a matter of law.
But how did the court come to reach the conclusion that Laux's
conduct was "extreme and outrageous," given that his conduct consisted of nothing more than interviewing, at that point, an alleged
rape victim? What standard did the court use? And was that standard liberal, consistent, or restrictive in light of the legal framework
that the court had utilized in past IIED claims? By holding that
Laux's language-based conduct was "extreme and outrageous" as a
matter of law, does the court in Brandon evidence a judicial trend in
Nebraska toward a more permissive approach to IIED claims, in gen"Laux stated that [the victim's] absence from a scheduled second [investigative]
interview reflected poorly on her credibility as to the truthfulness of the reported
sexual and physical assaults upon her by Lotter and Nissen." Brandon v. County
of Richardson (Brandon I), 252 Neb. 839, 845, 566 N.W.2d 776, 781 (1997) (quoting JoAnn Brandon's amended petition). Richardson County and Laux filed a
demurrer to the amended petition, which was sustained. The district court then
gave JoAnn Brandon leave to again amend her petition with regard to all her
causes of action except that for IIED, which the district court simply dismissed.
Next, JoAnn Brandon filed a second amended petition, but she again alleged a
cause of action for Brandon's pre-death IIED. The district court again sustained
a demurrer filed by Richardson County and Laux in response to JoAnn Brandon's
second amended petition. Also, the district court denied JoAnn Brandon further
leave to amend. The district court, Richardson County, William B. Rist, J., dismissed the entire case. JoAnn Brandon then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme
Court.
In Brandon I, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court's
granting of the demurrer and held that: (1) JoAnn Brandon's petition did state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Richardson County and
Laux since a special relationship between Richardson County and Brandon was
created that gave rise to a duty of the investigating officers to protect Brandon
after she reported the rapes to the officers and after she agreed to aid in the
prosecution of Lotter and Nissen; (2) a claim for IED survives the death of the
victim; but (3) the alleged remarks made by Laux that Brandon's absence from
the scheduled interview reflected poorly on her credibility did not give rise to a
claim for IIED. Id. at 842-45, 566 N.W.2d at 779-81. The court, however, gave
JoAnn Brandon leave to amend her petition with regard to the IIED claim. Id. at
845, 566 N.W.2d at 781. The facts regarding the IIED claim set forth in the
amended petition then eventually gave rise to Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon
v. County of Richardson, 261 Neb. 636, 624 N.W.2d 604 (2001), the subject of this
Note.
5. 261 Neb. 636, 624 N.W.2d 604 (2001).
6. Id. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
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eral, and to "extreme and outrageous" conduct, in particular? The answer to this last question is, simply put, both yes and no.
On the one hand, certain portions of Brandon might give rise to
some concerns that the Nebraska Supreme Court is becoming more,
perhaps too, liberal in its approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" and IIED claims. Admittedly, Brandon does appear to illustrate
a more liberal approach to IIED when compared with past Nebraska
IIED cases. On the other hand, Brandon is still largely in keeping
with the overall standard and reasoning set forth in section 46 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the Nebraska Supreme Court
has rigorously employed in past IIED claims brought before it. Further, Brandon gives no serious indication that the court has any intention of developing any standard of recovery for IIED claims
significantly different from that set forth in section 46 of the Restatement. Similarly, there is no indication that the court has fallen prey
to a slippery slope whereby all sorts of conduct could be deemed "extreme and outrageous." Consequently, Brandon illustrates Nebraska's (more or less) consistent approach to "extreme and
outrageous conduct" and IIED.
Part II of this Note discusses the factual background of Brandon
and sets forth Laux's conduct in greater detail. Part III presents the
legal framework, including a survey of past Nebraska IIED cases,
upon which Brandon can be analyzed. Part IV analyzes the Nebraska
Supreme Court's decision in Brandon, beginning with a brief discussion of what standard of recovery the court used. Part IV then continues with an analysis of whether more specific portions of the court's
reasoning in Brandon are in keeping with the court's past standard of
recovery for IIED and whether Brandon will lead to a slippery slope
regarding what kinds of conduct are "extreme and outrageous" for the
purposes of IIED claims in Nebraska. This Note concludes by suggesting that Brandon is largely in keeping with the standards and recommendations of section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
further explains how Brandon sheds light on the Nebraska Supreme
Court's (more or less) stable approach to IIED claims and "extreme
and outrageous conduct."
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF BRANDON

Sometime after Brandon moved to Richardson County, Lotter and
Nissen, both acquaintances of Brandon, became suspicious of Brandon's sex.7 On the evening of December 24, 1993, Nissen had a party
7. Brandon suffered from gender identity disorder. Id. at 640, 624 N.W.2d at 611.
This is a condition in which one develops an intense dislike for one's own gender
and assumes the behavioral and emotional traits of the other gender. BRYAN
STRONG & CHRISTINE DEVAULT, HUMAN SEXUALITY:

DIVERSITY IN CONTEMPORARY

AMERICA 152 (2d ed. 1997). While living in Richardson County, Brandon
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at his home, during which Nissen and Lotter pulled Brandon's pants
down in an attempt to prove that Brandon was a female. On the
morning of December 25, 1993, Lotter and Nissen beat Brandon and
then drove her to a remote location where both men proceeded to rape
her. After Nissen beat Brandon again, all three returned to Nissen's
home. Once there, Brandon eventually escaped by kicking out a bathroom window. Brandon ran to a friend's home and was then transported to a local hospital for a rape examination. The examination
indicated that Brandon had indeed been sexually penetrated just
hours before. 8
Later that same day, Brandon provided a written statement to the
Falls City Police Department regarding the rapes, 9 even though Lotter and Nissen had threatened her life if she reported the rapes to
anyone.O Laux and Tom Olberding ("Olberding") of the Richardson
County Sheriffs Office then conducted a tape-recorded investigative
interview with Brandon regarding the rapes. After Laux and Olberding conducted an initial interview together, Laux, by himself, again
asked Brandon to recount the details of the rapes."l This interview
between Laux and Brandon was also tape-recorded. It was this interview that gave rise to the IIED claim in Brandon.
During the interview, Laux first questioned Brandon about the incident that occurred at Nissen's house where Lotter and Nissen pulled
down Brandon's pants. The following exchanges took place between
Brandon and Laux.
[Laux:] [After he pulled your pants down and seen you was a girl, what did
he do? Did he fondle you any?
[Brandon:] No.
[Laux:] He didn't fondle you any, huh. Didn't that kind of amaze you? ...
Doesn't that kind of, ah, get your attention somehow that he would've put his
hands in your pants and play with you a little bit?
[Laux:] fYlou were all half-ass drunk.... I can't believe that if he pulled your
pants down and you are a female he didn't stick his hand in you or his finger
in you.
[Brandon:] Well, he didn't.
12
[Laux:] I can't believe he didn't.

Laux then proceeded to question Brandon about the rapes. Included among Laux's statements and questions were the following:
"So they got ready to poke you"; "[T]hey tried sinking it in your vagina"; "So then after he couldn't stick it in your vagina he stuck it in

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

presented herself to others as a man and began dating a young woman who believed that Brandon was a man. Brandon, 261 Neb. at 640, 624 N.W.2d at 611.
Brandon, 261 Neb. at 640-41, 624 N.W.2d at 611.
Id. at 641, 624 N.W.2d at 611.
Id. at 646, 624 N.W.2d at 614.
Id. at 641, 624 N.W.2d at 611-12.
Id. at 642, 624 N.W.2d at 612.
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your box or in your buttocks, is that right?"; "[Did it feel like he stuck
it in very far or not?"; "Did he tell you anything about this is how they
do it in the penitentiary?"; "Was he enjoying it?"; "Did he think it was
funny?"; "Did he play with your breasts or anything?"; and "Well, was
3
he fingering you?"1
Laux then inquired about the position of Brandon's legs when Nissen sexually assaulted her. The following exchange took place:
[Laux:] How did you have your legs when he was trying to do that?
[Brandon:] He had them positioned on each side and he was positioned in
between my legs.
[Laux:] You had your legs, ah, your feet up around his back or did you just
have them off to the sides or what?
[Brandon:] I had one foot on the floor and the other on the seat.
[Laux:] He had you on the back seat and you had one leg on the seat the one
leg up up over the front seat or where?
[Brandon:] One leg on the floor and the other just laying [sic] on the seat not
on top of the guy.
[Laux:] You had one leg on the back seat and one leg laying [sic] on the floor.
Now just earlier when I asked, you, you said you had one leg up around him
and one leg over the seat.
[Brandon:] No, I didn't.
[Laux:] Yeah, because I can play it back for you.
[Brandon:] Then play it back because I don't understand it.14

Laux then questioned Brandon about Lotter sexually assaulting
her. The following exchange took place:
[Laux:] After he got his pants down he got a spread of you, or had spread you

out, and he got a spread of you then, then what happened?
[Brandon:] When he finished he got out of the car and got back in the driver's
door.
[Laux:] Well, how did, ah, let's back up here for a second. First of all you
didn't say anything about him getting it up. Did he have a hard on when he
got back there or what?
[Brandon:] I don't know. I didn't look.
[Laux:] You didn't look. Did he take a little time working it up, or what? Did
you work it up for him?
[Brandon:] No, I didn't.
[Laux:] You didn't work it up for him?
[Brandon:] No.
[Laux:] Then you think he had it worked up on his own, or what?
[Brandon:] I guess so, I don't know.
[Laux:] You don't know.... Did, when he got in the back seat you were already spread out back there ready for him, waiting on him.
[Brandon:] No, I was sitting up when he got back there.15

Laux then proceeded to question Brandon about her past sexual
experiences.
[Laux:] And you have never had any sex before?
13. Id.
14. Id. at 642-43, 624 N.W.2d at 612.
15. Id. at 643, 624 N.W.2d at 613.
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[Brandon:] No.
[Laux:] How old are you?
[Brandon:] 21.
[Laux:] And if you're 21, you think you'd have, you'd have, trouble getting it
in?
[Brandon:] Who me?
[Laux:] Yeah.
16
[Brandon:] I guess so. He was.

Finally, Laux questioned Brandon about her gender identity crisis.
The following exchanges took place:
[Laux:] Why do you run around with girls instead of, ah, guys being you are a
girl yourself?
(Brandon:] Why do I what?
[Laux:] Why do you run around with girls instead of guys beings you're a girl
yourself? Why do you make girls think you're a guy?
[Brandon:] I haven't the slightest idea.
[Laux:] You haven't the slightest idea? You go around kissing other girls?...
[T]he girls that don't know about you, thinks [sic] you are a guy. Do you kiss
them?
[Brandon:] What does this have to do with what happened last night?
[Laux:] Because I'm trying to get some answers so I know exactly what's going on. Now, do you want to answer that question for me or not?
[Brandon:] I don't see why I have to.
[Laux:] Huh?
[Brandon:] I don't see why I have to.
[Brandon:] 'Cause I have a sexual identity crisis.
[Laux:] Your what?
[Brandon:] I have a sexual identity crisis.
[Laux:] You want to explain that?
17
[Brandon:] I don't know if I can even talk about it.

In addition to the foregoing language Laux used throughout this
tape-recorded interview, Laux openly referred to Brandon as an "it,"
once while in Brandon's presence.1S Also, subsequent to Brandon's
death, Laux asked Brandon's sister, "what kind of sister did [you]
have?"

19

At trial, Laux testified that his conduct while interviewing Brandon on December 25, 1993 was due to concerns he had as to whether
Brandon was being completely truthful. 20 Laux stated that he questioned Brandon's credibility since she had a history of forgery 2 l and
had been deceiving people in the local community as to her gender.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 643-44, 624 N.W.2d at 613.
Id. at 644, 624 N.W.2d at 613.
Id. at 640, 624 N.W.2d at 611.
Id. at 658, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
Id. at 647, 624 N.W.2d at 615.
Brandon had been convicted of forgery in Lancaster County, Nebraska, and had
violated the terms of her probation. Id. at 640, 624 N.W.2d at 611. In addition,
on December 15, 1993, only ten days before Laux interviewed Brandon about the
rapes, Brandon was booked into the Richardson County jail on forgery charges for
forging checks in Richardson County. Id.
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Laux also stated that his conduct was attributable to Brandon's taking an unusually long time to answer questions during the interview.
Laux admitted, however, that Brandon's gender identity disorder was
entirely irrelevant to her claims that she had been raped. 22
Several law enforcement officers' testimony at trial lent support to
the IIED claim. For example, Olberding testified that he left the room
when Laux was interviewing Brandon because he "didn't think it was
right to do that,"2 3 that is, use the language that Laux used and ask

certain questions that Laux asked. Similarly, assistant police chief for
the Falls City Police Department, John Caverzagie, testified that he
believed that "just about everything" Laux said during the interview
was "very unprofessional." 24 Caverzagie agreed that Laux's conduct
was outrageous. Jack Wyant, a retired Nebraska State Patrol criminal investigator, testified that he saw no reason for Laux to be rude or
abrasive while questioning Brandon.25
A prosecutor experienced with sexual assault cases testified on behalf of both the County and Laux. When asked about Laux's conduct
during the interview, the prosecutor testified that Laux "was seeking
[Brandon's] story, he was trying to get an idea of her version of events.
He was trying to get detailed information from her about the chronol-

ogy of events as well as what the events were." 26 The prosecutor fur-

ther testified that Laux perhaps used "locker room talk" and some
inappropriate language when conducting the interview, but that Laux
was not unnecessarily confrontational with Brandon. Finally, the
prosecutor testified that prior to trial, hearings, or depositions, prosecutors are customarily tougher and more confrontational with victims
of sexual assault than Laux was in conducting the interview. 2 7
After considering the foregoing tape-recorded interview and witness testimony, the trial court, Richardson County, Judge Orville L.
Coady, denied recovery on the IIED claim, holding that Laux's conduct
toward Brandon was not "extreme and outrageous" and that Laux's
conduct was "reasonable and necessary to prepare [Brandon] to testify
at public trial."2s Further, the trial court held that there was insuffi-

cient proof that Brandon suffered emotional distress as a result of
Laux's conduct. 29 JoAnn Brandon timely appealed the trial court's
decision.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 647, 624 N.W.2d at 615.
Id. at 648, 624 N.W.2d at 615.
Id. at 648, 624 N.W.2d at 616.
Id.
Id. at 649, 624 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting the prosecutor's testimony on direct
examination).
27. Id. at 649-50, 624 N.W.2d at 616-17.
28. Id. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621 (quoting the trial court's opinion).
29. Id. at 652-53, 624 N.W.2d at 618. Having already determined that Laux's conduct towards Brandon was not "extreme and outrageous," it is unclear why the
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the trial court's decision
and held that Laux's conduct was "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law. 30 The court found none of the County's attempts to justify
Laux's conduct persuasive. In reviewing the tape-recorded interview,
the court stated that it found no places where Laux was attempting to
clarify inconsistencies, that irrelevant questions asked during the interview hardly contributed to "fact finding," that it was inappropriate
for Laux to attempt to prepare Brandon for trial just hours after the
sexual assaults had occurred, and that Laux's language indicated that
31
he was simply expressing a prurient interest in the sexual assaults.
Finding Laux's conduct "extreme and outrageous," the court then remanded to the trial court the issue of whether Laux's conduct
throughout the interview caused Brandon to suffer emotional distress
so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it.32

trial court proceeded to rule on the causation issue. If there was no "extreme and
outrageous conduct" to begin with, there was no causation to find. See infra Part
III (discussing the prima facie elements of an IIED claim).
30. Brandon, 261 Neb. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
31. Id. at 660-61, 624 N.W.2d at 623.
32. Id. at 663, 624 N.W.2d at 624-25. The parties did not raise any issues at all
regarding whether the first prima facie element of IED-intentional or reckless
conduct-had been proven. Id. at 656-57, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
On remand, the trial court judge found that Laux's conduct did cause Brandon
severe emotional distress. In a June 2001 hearing, JoAnn Brandon's attorney
asked the trial court judge to award $240,000 in damages for emotional distress.
The judge, Orville L. Coady, instead awarded only $7,000. David Hendee, Brandon Case Returns to State's High Court, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 24, 2001, at
1B, available at 2001 WL 9589068; David Hendee, Suit Award Angers Mom of
Brandon, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 5, 2001, at 1B, available at 2001 WL
9587478. JoAnn Brandon appealed that damage award to the Nebraska Supreme Court, marking the third, and final, time that the Brandon matter would
be taken to Nebraska's highest court. On November 5, 2002, JoAnn Brandon's
attorney "took the unprecedented step.., of asking the Nebraska Supreme Court
to intervene and personally award more damages . . . ." Paul Hammel, More
Money Sought in Brandon Case, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 6, 2002, at 1A,
available at 2002 WL 5348249. JoAnn Brandon's attorney argued that the Nebraska Supreme Court or a judge other than District Judge Orville Coady should
decide the amount of damages. Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed and
upheld the $7,000 damage award on the IIED claim. In its opinion, the court
stated that the district court found that Brandon was upset by Laux's conduct but
that "Brandon's emotions were affected primarily by Nissen and Lotter and the
mental anguish resulting from the rape and threat to her life." Brandon v.
County of Richardson, 264 Neb. 1020, 1028, 653 N.W.2d 829, 837 (2002). The
Nebraska Supreme Court simply refused to "interfere with the judgment of the
fact finder in awarding damages for mental anguish . . . ." Id. at 1029, 653
N.W.2d at 837; see also Robynn Tysver, Teena Brandon Award to Stand, High
Court Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 6, 2002, at 1A, available at 2002 WL
5350708 (reporting on the damage award).
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RELEVANT LAW: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF IIED
IN NEBRASKA

Two separate, yet equally relevant, types of legal authority govern
IIED claims in Nebraska. First, section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the basic legal framework of an IIED claim.
Second, Nebraska case law interprets and applies the language of section 46.
A.

Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts

In pertinent part, section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm."33 In other words, a plaintiff
must prove each of three elements in order to make a prima facie case
for IIED: (1) that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2)
that the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous," and (3)
that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff severe emotional
34
distress.
Among these prima facie elements, determining what rises to the
level of "extreme and outrageous conduct" has often created the most
difficulty. 35 This only stands to reason. There is no hard-and-fast
rule as to what conduct is "extreme and outrageous." "There is no litmus test for outrageousness; whether conduct was36outrageous and extreme must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis."
Nonetheless, the official comments to section 46 attempt to define
what might generally constitute "extreme and outrageous conduct."
These comments explain that liability for IIED is imposed only when
the defendant's conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."37 Generally, a defendant's conduct is "extreme and outrageous"
only if it would cause an "average member of the community" to ex38
claim, "'Outrageous!"'
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).

34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Gall v. Great W. Sugar Co., 219 Neb. 354, 363 N.W.2d 373 (1985)
(Shanahan & Grant, JJ., dissenting); Hassing v. Wortman, 214 Neb. 154, 333
N.W.2d 765 (1983) (Krivosha, C.J. & White, J., dissenting); Davis v. Texaco, Inc.,
210 Neb. 67, 313 N.W.2d 221 (1981) (Krivosha, C.J. & White, J., dissenting).
36. Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir.
1999).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
38. Id.
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Liability is not, however, to be imposed for "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."39
The Restatement recognizes that plaintiffs "must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and
unkind."40 Liability cannot be imposed each and every time "some
one's feelings are hurt."41
In addition, the comments to section 46 indicate general circumstances under which recovery for IIED might be had. For instance,
the outrageousness of a defendant's conduct may arise from a defendant's abuse "of a position, or a relation with the [plaintiff], which
gives [the defendant] actual or apparent authority over the [plaintiff]."42 In particular, police officers are among those who have been
held liable for abuse of their position, although liability has not been
43
imposed for petty insults and annoyances.
Moreover, a defendant's "extreme and outrageous conduct" "may
arise from the [defendant's] knowledge that the [plaintiff] is peculiarly
susceptible to emotional distress." 44 Conduct otherwise not "extreme
and outrageous" may become so when the defendant "proceeds in the
face of such knowledge."45 Again, however, the defendant's conduct
must still be "extreme and outrageous," and it is not sufficient that the
6
defendant simply knows that the plaintiffs feelings might be hurt.4
Finally, it is left to the court to first decide whether the defendant's
conduct "may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as
to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so."4 7 The jury shall
decide whether the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous"
when reasonable persons may differ. Otherwise, the court may find
that the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous" as a mat48
ter of law.
With just three prima facie elements, a claim for IIED may seem
deceptively simple. Section 46 no doubt provides some guidance, although its suggestions as to what conduct is "extreme and outrageous"
are arguably vague to the point of being unhelpful. Fortunately, the
Nebraska Supreme Court's past interpretation and applications of
section 46 provide, to some degree, a useful sampling of what kinds of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. cmt. e.
Id.
Id. cmt. f.
Id.
Id.
Id. cmt. h.
Id.
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conduct are "extreme and outrageous" for the purposes of IIED claims
brought in Nebraska courts.
B.

Past IED Claims Brought Before the Nebraska Supreme
Court

Throughout the past several decades, a number of IIED claims
have been brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court. 49 In these
cases, the court overwhelmingly applied section 46 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.50 A brief discussion of these past IIED claims provides substance to the section 46 framework as applied in Nebraska
and provides a sense of the kinds of conduct that the court has found
to be "extreme and outrageous."
Of these past IIED claims, the court usually declined to award the
plaintiff legal recovery for IIED, due in large part to an unwillingness
to find the defendant's conduct "extreme and outrageous." Still, there
are several cases in which the court did find there to be "extreme and
outrageous conduct."
For instance, in La Salle Extension University v. Fogarty,5 1 the
court held that a creditor's attempt to collect a debt by mailing almost
forty "damaging, threatening, harassing and malicious letters, notices
and warnings"5 2 to the alleged debtor constituted conduct sufficient to
warrant the alleged debtor's recovery for mental suffering. 5 3 Some of
these letters contained accusations of dishonesty and moral turpitude
and threats of legal action; others were mailed to the alleged debtor's
employer and neighbors, thereby causing the alleged debtor to be humiliated and to nearly lose his job.
In addition, there are more recent cases in which the court found
the defendant's conduct to be "extreme and outrageous." In Mindt v.
Shavers,5 4 the defendant sexually assaulted the plaintiff and ejacu49. This Note narrows its focus to IIED claims brought before the Nebraska Supreme
Court. To be sure, IIED claims have been brought before the Nebraska Court of
Appeals, as well. See, e.g., Vergara v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 1141, 510
N.W.2d 550 (1993); Wadman v. State, 1 Neb. Ct. App. 839, 510 N.W.2d 426
(1993).
50. See, e.g., Nichols v. Busse, 243 Neb. 811, 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993); Gall v. Great W.
Sugar Co., 219 Neb. 354, 363 N.W.2d 373 (1985); Hassing v. Wortman, 214 Neb.
154, 333 N.W.2d 765 (1983); Paasch v. Brown, 193 Neb. 368, 227 N.W.2d 402
(1975).
51. 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934). Note should be taken that Fogarty pre-dates
section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In making its decision, however,
the court, for all practical purposes, applied the very standard that would become
what is now section 46. Thus, Fogarty is as relevant to this discussion as any
case that the court heard after the development, and the court's adoption, of section 46.
52. Id. at 458, 253 N.W. at 424.
53. Id. at 463, 253 N.W. at 426.
54. 214 Neb. 786, 337 N.W.2d 97 (1983).
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lated on the plaintiffs body and clothing. Without discussion, the
court held this to be "extreme and outrageous conduct."55
In Nichols v. Busse,5 6 the defendant was in a car accident with the
plaintiffs daughter, who died shortly after the accident occurred. Immediately after the accident, the defendant dragged the plaintiffs
daughter's body from the vehicle and placed it in a ditch. The defendant then returned home, eventually telephoned the plaintiff, and told
her that her daughter had stolen his vehicle and that "something horrible ha[d] happened."57 Not until the discovery of his vehicle 58 did
the defendant finally come forward about the accident, and the plaintiff was then informed of her daughter's death. The court found that
the defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff mother was "extreme and
59
outrageous."
Finally, in Dale v. Thomas FuneralHome, Inc.,60 a widow sued a
funeral home for IIED because it refused to release her husband's
corpse until an embalming bill was paid. Ambiguously, the court was
willing to note only that the funeral home's conduct "may" have been
"extreme and outrageous."61
In contrast to these relatively few cases in which the court found
that there was, or that there may have been, "extreme and outrageous
conduct," there are many more cases in which the court declined to
find "extreme and outrageous conduct." These cases set forth a variety of (sometimes bizarre) fact patterns.
55. Id. at 792, 337 N.W.2d at 101. In Mindt, the court noted that a sexual assault is
"uniquely appropriate" for a claim for IIED. Id. However, a sexual assault does
not ipso facto give rise to recovery for IIED. In Reavis v. Slominski, 250 Neb. 711,
551 N.W.2d 528 (1996), the plaintiff attempted to make such an argument and
proposed that the jury instructions state: "Should you find from a preponderance
of the evidence presented that the actions of the Defendant... constituted a nonconsensual sexual assault, you may find that the assault constitutes an intentional infliction of emotional distress .... ." Id. at 730, 551 N.W.2d at 543. The
court held that the trial court properly refused to submit that instruction since it
only addressed that element of an IED claim requiring that a defendant's conduct be intentional or reckless. Even in cases of sexual assault, the court stated,
a plaintiff must still prove, and a jury must still find, that the defendant's conduct was outrageous and that the conduct caused the plaintiff severe emotional
distress. Id. at 730-31, 551 N.W.2d at 543.
56. 243 Neb. 811, 503 N.W.2d 173 (1993).
57. Id. at 814, 503 N.W.2d at 178.
58. It is unclear exactly where the defendant's vehicle was located before it was finally discovered. The defendant had contacted the police and reported the vehicle stolen, and the defendant repeatedly denied any knowledge of the
whereabouts of the vehicle. Id.
59. Id. at 817, 503 N.W.2d at 179.
60. 237 Neb. 528, 466 N.W.2d 805 (1991).
61. Id. at 531-32, 466 N.W.2d at 808. Such a characterization of the defendant's conduct was nonetheless irrelevant because the court held that the plaintiff failed to
prove that her distress was severe enough to warrant recovery. Id. at 532, 566
N.W.2d at 808.
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In Davis v. Texaco, Inc.,62 for instance, the plaintiff visited a service station where she was splashed and burned with scalding radiator fluid when the attendant removed the plaintiffs radiator cap. As
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, explained:
The evidence shows that [the plaintiff] was burned by the negligent acts of a
Texaco station employee. She was compelled to remove her outer garments
which were saturated with hot radiator fluid. She requested something to
cover herself and was given a filthy fender skirt to cover her partial nakedness. While attempting to leave the premises to secure medical treatment
while naturally upset, hysterical, and in pain, the woman found that the station attendant had removed the ignition coil from her automobile and he
would not restore it unless she surrendered the fender cover, thus leaving her
partially clad on a major thoroughfare in Omaha, Nebraska. Finally, she suf63
fered the indignity of being forced to bargain for a used shirt.

The majority of the court did not find the attendant's conduct "extreme and outrageous." 64
In Hassing v. Wortman,65 the defendant, the plaintiffs ex-husband, persisted in harassing the plaintiff. He constantly drove by the
plaintiffs house, crawled in her bushes, attempted to force her car off
of the road, entered her house through an unlocked door, attempted to
initiate a scheme whereby she would learn that her teaching contract
would not be renewed, and indicated to relatives that she was pregnant when she and the defendant married but that the defendant was
not the father. The court held that while the defendant acted in a
"childish, irresponsible, and inconsiderate fashion," it was "doubtful"
that the defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous." 6 6
In Foreman v. AS Mid-America, Inc.,67 the court similarly declined
to find "extreme and outrageous conduct." 68 In that case, the plaintiffs, who were non-union employees, endured a campaign of harassment and intimidation conducted by the defendant's union employees.
The union employees repeatedly followed the plaintiffs home after
work, physically threatened the plaintiffs and called them names,
placed threatening phone calls to the plaintiffs' homes, damaged the
plaintiffs' property, and spread dog feces on one of the plaintiffs
clothes.
In Gall v. Great Western Sugar Co.,69 one of the defendant's claims
agents telephoned the plaintiff and told her that her husband, who
had only one arm, would be required to accept a particular job availa62. 210 Neb. 67, 313 N.W.2d 221 (1981).
63. Id. at 71-72, 313 N.W.2d at 224.
64. Id. at 71, 313 N.W.2d at 223. Justice White, in his concurrence, in which Chief
Justice Krivosha joined, disagreed.
65. 214 Neb. 154, 333 N.W.2d 765 (1983).
66. Id. at 157-58, 333 N.W.2d at 767.
67. 255 Neb. 323, 586 N.W.2d 290 (1998).
68. Id. at 346, 586 N.W.2d at 306.
69. 219 Neb. 354, 363 N.W.2d 373 (1985).
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ble with his employer. The plaintiff was told that if her husband did
not accept the job, all of his insurance would be cancelled and he
would be fired. The court held that this was not "extreme and outra70
geous conduct."
71
Additionally, failing to comply with a court injunction or decree,
participating in a consensual sexual relationship that later goes
awry, 72 moving one's possessions from one building to another in a
manner that was perceived by the plaintiff as threatening, 73 and exclaiming that one's absence from a scheduled interview with the police
reflected poorly on one's credibility 74 have all been held to not constitute "extreme and outrageous conduct" for the purposes of IIED in
Nebraska.
This brief survey of past IIED claims brought before the Nebraska
Supreme Court gives a sampling of the kinds of claims that the court
has heard and the kinds of conduct that are and are not "extreme and
outrageous" in Nebraska. With both these past IIED claims and section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in mind, Brandon can be
properly analyzed.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF BRANDON EX REL. ESTATE OF BRANDON
V. COUNTY OF RICHARDSON

Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. County of Richardson serves
to further develop the Nebraska Supreme Court's approach to IIED
claims, generally, and to "extreme and outrageous conduct," more specifically. The development, largely, continues to be consistent, or stable. As in past cases, the court generally adhered to the standards
and recommendations of section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in its analysis of the IIED claim in Brandon.
At the same time, portions of Brandon might give rise to concerns
that the court is becoming more relaxed in its application of section 46
and in its approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct." Such con70. Id. at 360, 363 N.W.2d at 378.
71. Paasch v. Brown, 193 Neb. 368, 227 N.W.2d 402 (1975).
72. Iwanski v. Gomes, 259 Neb. 632, 611 N.W.2d 607 (2000); Schieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese of Omaha, 244 Neb. 715, 508 N.W.2d 907 (1993).
73. Pick v. Fordyce Co-op Credit Ass'n, 225 Neb. 714, 408 N.W.2d 248 (1987). Here,
more specifically, one of the plaintiffs' tenants was moving out of a leased commercial space into another space. The defendant's move apparently caught one of
the plaintiffs, Mrs. Pick, by surprise. She testified that, during the defendant's
move, she heard a "tremendous amount of racket on the side of my house which is
towards the bank building." Id. at 719, 408 N.W.2d at 252. She further stated
that her little girls were frightened, that she did not know what was going on,
and that "[i]t looked like Gun Smoke, walking towards the house." Id. at 719, 408
N.W.2d at 253.
74. Brandon v. County of Richardson (Brandon I), 252 Neb. 839, 845, 566 N.W.2d
776, 781 (1997).
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cerns might stem from the court's focus on the nature of Laux's tone of
voice for the purposes of finding his conduct "extreme and outrageous," as well as from the fact that Laux's conduct was completely
language-based rather than act-based. Further, some may question
the wisdom of the court in finding Laux's language-based conduct "extreme and outrageous as a matter of law."7 5
Even so, any real serious concerns of the court's taking a more relaxed approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" and IIED are unfounded. The court, for example, did not put as much emphasis on
Laux's tone of voice as it could have. Section 46 does clearly permit
legal recovery for a defendant's language-based conduct alone. Section 46 also expressly permits a court to find conduct "extreme and
outrageous" as a matter of law. Moreover, Brandon gives no indication that the court has any intention of developing any standard of
recovery in lieu of section 46, or that the court has fallen prey to a
slippery slope whereby all sorts of conduct-and all sorts of language-may be deemed "extreme and outrageous."
Simply put, Brandon, in certain respects, may well take a relatively more liberal approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" and
IIED than past Nebraska IIED cases. At the same time, Brandon still
overwhelmingly applies and adheres to the fundamental framework of
section 46 of the Restatement. Consequently, Brandon evidences Nebraska's (more or less) stable approach to "extreme and outrageous
conduct" and IIED.
A.

Brandon is Generally Within the Parameters of Section
46

Generally, Brandon is in keeping with the Nebraska Supreme
Court's long-standing application of section 46 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The court continued to require that the plaintiff
prove three prima facie elements-(1) intentional or reckless conduct,
(2) "extreme and outrageous conduct," and (3) causation of severe emotional distress-in order to recover for IIED.76 In addition, when analyzing and deciding whether Laux's conduct was "extreme and
outrageous," the court by and large applied and adhered to the guidelines set forth in the comments of section 46. In particular, the court
used comments e 77 and f78 of section 46 in reasoning that Laux's con75. Brandon, 261 Neb. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621 ("we determine . . . that Laux's
conduct was extreme and outrageous as a matter of law").
76. Id. at 656, 624 N.W.2d at 620-21.
77. Recall that this comment suggests that "extreme and outrageous conduct" may
arise from the defendant's abuse of a position of power in relation to the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965).
78. Recall that this comment suggests that "extreme and outrageous conduct" may
arise if the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable
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duct was "extreme and outrageous." Namely, the court found that
Laux, a law enforcement officer conducting a rape investigation, was
in a position of power or authority in relation to Brandon, the alleged
79
The court also
victim of the rapes who went to Laux for assistance.
reasoned that Laux proceeded to use "crude and dehumanizing language" even though he knew that Brandon was in a particularly vulnerable emotional state.8 0
Rather surprisingly, however, the court made only one reference to
comment d of section 46,81 which suggests that liability may not be
82
imposed for mere "insults," "indignities," or "rough language." Since
Laux's conduct consisted wholly of language use, it is curious that the
court did not make more of an effort to balance "rough language," for
which legal recovery may not be had, against "extreme and outrageous" language, for which legal recovery is available. Presumably,
the court found Laux's language to be so "extreme and outrageous"
that it did not believe a lengthy discussion balancing "rough language"
against "extreme and outrageous" language was necessary; the court
did, after all, find Laux's conduct "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law. At any rate, the court's sole reference to comment d of section 46 indicates that it at least remained mindful of the Restatement's
warning against imposing tort liability for "rough language." Moreover, the court's use of Laux's position of authority and Laux's knowledge of Brandon's emotional state as factors in reasoning that Laux's
conduct was "extreme and outrageous" is well within the recommendations and boundaries of section 46.
Generally, then, the court's reasoning in Brandon is within the parameters of section 46 of the Restatement. Nonetheless, the court was
not as strict in its adherence to section 46 as it could have been, possibly giving rise to concerns that the court has begun to take a more
liberal approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" and IIED
claims.
B.

The Court's Emphasis on Laux's Tone of Voice is
Questionable

As seen above, the court largely applied the section 46 standard in
its analysis of JoAnn Brandon's IIED claim and in its finding Laux's

79.
80.

81.
82.

to emotional distress and yet nonetheless chooses to engage in intentional or
reckless conduct. Id. cmt. f.
Brandon, 261 Neb. at 658, 624 N.W.2d at 621-22.
Id. The court stated that having been beaten and raped in and of itself was sufficient to demonstrate to Laux that Brandon was in a particularly fragile emotional condition. Id. at 658, 624 N.W.2d at 622 (citing Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d
1308 (D.C. 1994)).
Id. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
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conduct "extreme and outrageous." Nonetheless, certain portions of
the court's reasoning seem to stray from, and fall outside of, the standards and recommendations of section 46. Namely, the court's emphasis on Laux's tone of voice for the purposes of finding Laux's conduct
"extreme and outrageous" is questionable under section 46
and its official comments.
The court's focus on the tone of voice that Laux used throughout
the course of the interview with Brandon is set forth in two places in
the court's decision. First, the court stated that the "tone used during
the interview is also something to be considered in determining the
outrageousness of Laux's conduct."83 Later, the court again emphasized that Laux's tone of voice was "very significant" for the purposes
of determining outrageousness.S4 Precisely how much Laux's tone of
voice influenced the court in finding his conduct "extreme and outrageous" remains unclear. These quotations, though, suggest that it
played more than a marginal role.
Section 46 does not explicitly indicate whether the nature of a defendant's tone of voice may be an appropriate factor for a court to so
heavily consider when determining if a defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous."85 In this respect, the court did not directly
disregard the language of section 46 and its comments by placing emphasis on Laux's tone of voice. However, comment d to section 46 at
least implicitly suggests that a significant emphasis on a defendant's
tone of voice might not be appropriate. According to comment d, tort
liability for IIED is not to extend to "mere insults," "annoyances,"
"1petty oppressions," and "rough language."86 Thus, under a
close,
scrutinized reading of section 46 and its comments, a finding that the
defendant's tone of voice was "demeaning, accusatory, and intimidating"8 7 might well be insufficient for a finding of "extreme and outrageous conduct."
Simply put, might not tone of voice, by its nature, more readily be
one of life's "petty oppressions," rather than "atrocious"?88 Is tone of
voice not more akin to the "rough language" to which plaintiffs living
in a complex society must necessarily become accustomed than it is
akin to conduct that is "utterly intolerable in a civilized community"?8 9 Other courts believe so. 90 One such court, for example, noted
83. Brandon, 261 Neb. at 659, 624 N.W.2d at 622.
84. Id. at 662, 624 N.W.2d at 624.

85. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

46.

86. Id. cmt. d.
87. In Brandon, the court described Laux's tone of voice as "demeaning, accusatory,
and intimidating." Brandon, 261 Neb. at 659, 624 N.W.2d at 622.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (explaining that liability for
IIED extends to "atrocious" conduct but not to "petty oppressions").
89. See id. (noting that plaintiffs are required to be "hardened to a certain amount of
rough language").
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that if a defendant's tone of voice constitutes "outrageous conduct," a
court would be "hard-pressed" to find conduct that is not "extreme and
outrageous." 9 1 Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court's more-than-marginal emphasis on Laux's tone of voice seems to constitute a somewhat
more relaxed approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" in comparison to the implicit suggestions of section 46, to other courts' applito the
cations of the language and official comments of section 46, and
92
prior IIED claims decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
C. "Extreme and Outrageous Conduct" in Nebraska: Just
How Slippery Does Brandon Make the Slope?
Particular aspects of Brandon might not convince scholars and
practitioners that the Nebraska Supreme Court is simply taking a stable, consistent approach to IIED claims and to "extreme and outrageous conduct." In placing significant emphasis on Laux's tone of
voice for the purposes of finding his conduct "extreme and outrageous"
and by holding that Laux's language-based conduct was "extreme and
outrageous" as a matter of law, the court might instead draw criticism
that it is taking too liberal of an approach to "extreme and outrageous
conduct" and IIED. One might wonder, in fact, if Brandon signals the
beginning of Nebraska's slide down the proverbial slippery slope
where the Nebraska Supreme Court will eventually make the relatively strict standards of section 46 all but meaningless.
Although these fears of an increasingly liberal approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" may well exist, they are largely unfounded. Brandon suggests that section 46 still stands strong. There
90. See, e.g., Lee v. Wojnaroski, 751 F. Supp. 58, 61 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the
plaintiffs claim for IIED could not withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiffs allegations consisted only of the defendant's
use of a particular tone of voice); see also Purdy v. City of Nashua, No. 98-627-JD,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6204, at *27-28 (D.N.H. April 17, 2000) (quoting section 46
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and holding, in part, that the defendant's
tone of voice did not constitute "extreme and outrageous conduct" since liability
does not extend to "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, or other trivialities"); Carrick v. Foster, No. 96-1989, 1997 WL 570366, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 1997) (holding that the plaintiff failed to allege "extreme and outrageous conduct" when she alleged that the defendant told her that she was overpaid, used a very "nasty" tone of voice, and asked her "who the hell" she was
talking to on the telephone). But see Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1315 n.19
(D.C. 1994) (indicating that the tone of the defendant's remarks could make a

"considerable difference" in determining whether the defendant's conduct was
"extreme and outrageous").
91. Lee, 751 F. Supp. at 61.
92. See supra section III.B. Prior to Brandon, it appears the court had never explicitly focused on the nature of a defendant's tone of voice for the purposes of finding
"extreme and outrageous conduct." Id.
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currently is no real serious threat of a slippery slope regarding "extreme and outrageous conduct" and future IIED claims in Nebraska.
1.

Concerns of a Slippery Slope Quieted: Section 46 Stands
Strong

First, in comparison to past IIED claims brought before the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Brandon decision represents the first such
claim in which the court placed explicit emphasis on the defendant's
tone of voice for the purposes of finding "extreme and outrageous conduct." Although this approach is questionable under section 46,93 the
court's consideration of a defendant's tone of voice, as demonstrated in
Brandon, is not as permissive, or relaxed, as it could potentially be.
Thus, the Brandon court did not too significantly stray from the standards and recommendations of section 46.
To be accurate, Brandon does not hold that a defendant's use of a
particular tone of voice by itself is necessarily sufficient to constitute
"extreme and outrageous conduct." It was not Laux's tone of
voice in
and of itself that was "extreme and outrageous." Rather, the court
found Laux's conduct "extreme and outrageous" based on the totality
of the circumstances-Laux's tone of voice coupled with his choice of
language, his position of authority, Brandon's emotional vulnerability,
94
and so on.
In other words, Brandon indicates that a defendant's tone of voice
may be considered as one of many factors when doing the outrageousness calculus. The court, however, has not indicated that it would entertain, much less sustain, a claim for IIED when the plaintiff alleges
only that the defendant used a particular tone of voice, whether accusatory, demeaning, crude, or the like.95
In focusing on Laux's tone of voice, then, the court may well have
focused on a single factor that might by itself fall outside the stan93. See supra section IV.B.
94. See Brandon, 261 Neb. at 656-62, 624 N.W.2d at 620-24.
95. Admittedly, it seems difficult to imagine a case where a plaintiff would base her
IIED claim solely on the defendant's tone of voice and would not concern herself
with the actual words that the defendant said. On the other hand, what happens
if someone mutters innocuous words but in a menacing way? Consider, for instance, what happens when one's boss or superior says, "Good morning, I sure
hope you have a good day today." In this kind of case, tone of voice could be quite
significant. On the one hand, the boss or superior could cheeringly say the words
to the subordinate. On the other hand, the boss or superior could say the words
menacingly or threateningly, perhaps implying, through tone of voice, that the
subordinate will find herself fired by day's end or that the boss or superior wishes
harm or misfortune on the subordinate. In either case, the words themselves
could not be the basis for an IIED claim, but are there grounds for an IIED claim
in the latter case due to tone of voice alone? Would the Nebraska Supreme Court,
in light of its emphasis on Laux's tone of voice in Brandon, entertain such a
claim?
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dards and language of section 46 and its comments. But, most importantly, the court in Brandon indicated that a number of factors falling
within the standards of section 46-a defendant's position of authority, for instance-must be present, as well. Thus, the importance of
section 46 continues, and Nebraska's approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct" remains (more or less) stable.
Second, Brandon represents an IIED claim where the defendant's
"extreme and outrageous conduct" was primarily language-based; that
is, Laux's conduct was more or less comprised of what he said to Brandon and how he said it. Until Brandon, most IIED claims appealed to
the court were precipitated largely by act-based, rather than by language-based, conduct. In sum, most prior defendants did, rather than
said.9 6 Laux, on the other hand, simply opened his mouth; he interviewed Brandon but made no threats, took no action, and made no
physical contact with Brandon.
To some, this distinction between act- and language-based conduct
97
To others, howfor the purposes of IIED claims may be negligible.
ever, a readiness to permit language-based IIED claims may conjure
up fears of a slippery slope where all kinds of language may become
grounds for legal recovery.9 8 In contrast to acts, words might tend to
96. See supra section III.B. In those cases in which the court found that there was or
that there may have been "extreme and outrageous conduct," the defendants' conduct was not primarily language-based. Instead, the conduct ranged anywhere
from incessantly sending malicious and threatening letters in Fogarty to deceptively dragging a body across a remote county road in Nichols, and from holding a
loved one's corpse hostage for the sake of debt collection in Dale to perpetrating a
sexual assault in Mindt. These kinds of behavior constitute something other
than the use of crude language, and, in some cases, might even rise to the level of
some other more traditional torts, such as assault, battery, and defamation.
Moreover, even most of those defendants party to IIED claims in which the court
declined to find "extreme and outrageous conduct" engaged in primarily actbased, rather than language-based, conduct.
In contrast to these many IIED claims precipitated by and large by a defendant's act-based conduct, recall that Brandon I and Gall do represent languagebased IIED claims. In Gall, the alleged "extreme and outrageous conduct" essentially consisted of statements made to the plaintiff during a telephone conversation. In Brandon I, the only allegation of 'extreme and outrageous conduct" was
that Laux stated that Brandon's absence from a scheduled interview reflected
poorly on her credibility as to the truth of the rapes committed by Lotter and
Nissen. The court declined to find 'extreme and outrageous conduct" in both
Brandon I and in Gall. See Brandon 1, 252 Neb. at 845, 566 N.W.2d at 781; Gall,
219 Neb. at 360-61, 363 N.W.2d at 378.
97. Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for instance, does not require
that the defendant engage in act-based conduct or make any kind of physical
contact with the plaintiff before liability may be imposed. The defendant need
engage only in "extreme and outrageous conduct," which can include languagebased conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
98. See, e.g., Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1309 (D.C. 1994). The facts of Drejza
were much like that of Brandon. The plaintiff, a victim of a sexual assault, reported the assault to a police detective, who, according to the plaintiff, was belit-
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play much more on one's individual values and sensitivities or sentiments, 9 9 precluding a court from drawing any meaningful line between legally recoverable language and language for which legal
recovery may not be had. Hence, holding one's use of language "extreme and outrageous" may be more readily vulnerable to a slippery
slope than would a court holding one's doing of acts or one's making
physical contact with the plaintiff "extreme and outrageous."
Ultimately, however, it seems difficult to ascertain whether, or to
what extent, language-based conduct is more susceptible to a slippery
slope. Most important, though, a plaintiffs legal recovery for a defendant's language-based conduct alone is completely within the bounds
of section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In fact, permitting
legal recovery for a defendant's language-based conduct, and that language-based conduct alone, appears to be one of the fundamental purposes of section 46. So-called parasitic damages are no longer needed;
section 46 recognizes IIED as a tort in and of itself. Thus, act-based
conduct is not necessarily needed in order for conduct to be "extreme
and outrageous."oo As such, the Nebraska Supreme Court's having
tling and insulting throughout the course of the investigative interview.
Essentially, the detective engaged in language-based conduct. Although the
court recognized that a decision in the plaintiffs favor "may conjure up visions...
of the proverbial slippery slope" with regard to IIED claims, the court allowed the
plaintiff to proceed with her claim. Id. at 1309.
99. See Bartow v. Smith, 78 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio 1948), overruled by Yeager v. Local
Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 453 N.E.2d
666 (Ohio 1983). In Bartow, the court refused to extend tort liability for IIED to
those instances in which the defendant only used defamatory, insulting and profane words absent making some threat, engaging in a menacing action, or making physical impact with the plaintiff, since the plaintiffs injuries would be "more
sentimental than substantial." Id. at 740.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b (indicating that IIED is a "separate and distinct basis of tort liability, without the presence of the elements necessary to any other tort, such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass to
land, or the like").
However, some courts, claiming to have adopted the section 46 standard,
nonetheless do seem to require that a defendant engage in something other than,
or something beyond, language-based conduct before tort liability for IIED may
be imposed. See Vernon v. Med. Mgmt. Ass'n of Margate, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1549,
1559 (S.D.Fla. 1996) (explaining that "[i]t is the element of offensive, non-negligible physical contact that, when coupled with persistent verbal abuse and
threats of retaliation, can under some facts and circumstances constitute conduct
of sufficient outrageousness to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress"); Johnson v. Thigpen, 788 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that the lower court correctly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the plaintiffs IIED claim, since the plaintiff endured both verbal abuse and repeated offensive, unwelcomed physical contact) (emphasis
added); see also Howard v. United States, No. 99-3865, 2000 WL1272590, at *4-5
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (holding that there was no extreme and outrageous conduct for the purposes of IIED when the defendants, DEA agents, conducted a
search of the plaintiffs' home without raising their voices, using foul language,

2003]

EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT

1309

no qualms about awarding legal recovery for IIED when the defendant
engaged in language-based conduct alone is hardly outside the parameters of, or liberal in relation to, section 46, although it does indeed
seem liberal in relation to past Nebraska IIED claims in the sense
that entirely language-based conduct has never before been held to be
"extreme and outrageous." In this respect, Brandon exhibits Nebraska's (more or less) stable approach to "extreme and outrageous
conduct" and IIED.
Third, the Brandon court went beyond finding Laux's conduct "exLaux's conduct to be
treme and outrageous." The court, in fact, found
"extreme and outrageous as a matter of law." 10 What is more, Brandon appears to mark the first time in which the Nebraska Supreme
Court has found any type of conduct, let alone language-based conduct, "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law for the purposes of
IIED. As such, concerns might again arise that this finding evidences
the court's willingness to take too permissive of an approach to IIED
claims. After Brandon, one might wonder what other kinds of conduct
might be "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law. What are the
limitations?
Admittedly, Brandon, in this respect, seems to provide evidence
that the court might be taking more of a permissive approach to IIED
claims. By finding Laux's language-based conduct "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law, the court essentially held that Laux's conduct was necessarily "extreme and outrageous" and that reasonable
men could not find that Laux's conduct was not "extreme and outrageous."1o 2 The court essentially held that Laux's conduct was so "exand making physical contact with the plaintiffs); Adams v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. 93AP-173, 1993 WL 310420, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1993) (sustaining
the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs
claim for IIED when the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant physically
touched her or threatened to discharge her from employment).
It is difficult to reconcile these courts' apparent requirements for an IIED
claim with the language of section 46, especially considering that these courts
purport to have adopted the section 46 standard. Clearly, a requirement of offensive physical contact, for instance, rises to the level of battery, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, which, again, is explicitly not required under section 46. See id. § 46 cmt. b (recognizing IIED as a separate basis for tort liability); id. cmt. k (explaining that recovery for IIED is not limited to "cases where
there has been bodily harm").
101. Brandon, 261 Neb. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h. More precisely, comment h
provides:
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where
reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the
court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
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treme and outrageous" that reasonable men could not differ on the
issue. This author is aware of no other instances in which the court
has found conduct for the purposes of IIED to be "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law.
At the same time, despite its arguably liberal relationship to past
Nebraska IIED claims, Brandon's holding that Laux's conduct was
"extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law is still perfectly in keeping with section 46-the court's overall, general IIED standard.
Again, comment h of section 46 explicitly permits a court to find conduct "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law. As such, the Nebraska Supreme Court is not in the midst of adopting any new, more
liberal standard in finding Laux's conduct "extreme and outrageous"
as a matter of law. The court instead has simply exhibited a greater
willingness to employ what seem to be the more liberal portions of the
guidelines and requirements already set forth in section 46-the standard that the court has faithfully used all along. Consequently, Brandon again sheds light on Nebraska's (more or less) stable approach to
"extreme and outrageous conduct" and IIED.
2.

Uncertain but Predictable: Language-Based Conduct and the
Future of IED in Nebraska

This, of course, is not to say that language-based IIED claims could
not lead to a slippery slope. For better or for worse, Brandon is only a
starting point. Eventually, a delicate balance between "rough language" and "extreme and outrageous" language must be struck, and it
is hard telling where that line will be drawn. Given Brandon, one
wonders just how far the court is willing to entertain future IIED
claims based on a defendant's use of language alone. For the purposes
of future IIED claims, under what circumstances will these languagebased claims likely succeed? What other language, used under what
other circumstances, might cause the court to exclaim, "Outrageous!"?
The answers, while admittedly uncertain, are at least somewhat predictable, which again, should alleviate serious concerns about the
feared slippery slope approach to "extreme and outrageous conduct"
and IIED.
Language-based IIED claims are in need of much further development in Nebraska before their limits can truly be known. Brandon,
read narrowly, might nonetheless work to indicate that legal recovery
for language-based IIED may not be had under just any circumstances. For instance, the court's emphasis both on a special relationship of sorts between Laux and Brandon and on the fact that Laux
proceeded to use "crude and dehumanizing language" knowing that
Brandon was emotionally vulnerable may quiet some concerns among
those fearful of too lenient a standard. In its reasoning, the court implies that it might be much less apt to find a defendant's language
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"extreme and outrageous" absent some kind of relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant and/or absent the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiffs emotional vulnerabilities. For example, a defendant who simply talks about taking "a little time working it up,"103
having "a hard on when he got back there,"10 4 and inquiring whether
one had "trouble getting it in,"' 0 5 while perhaps still "crude and dehumanizing," may not be "extreme and outrageous" for the purposes of
IIED in cases in which the defendant is not in a position of authority,
has no other special relationship with the plaintiff, or is unaware of
the plaintiffs peculiar emotional susceptibilities.
Still, Nebraska practitioners might be wise to remain cautious of
such generalizations and narrow readings of Brandon. The court has
not explicitly bound itself to finding language-based conduct "extreme
and outrageous" only when there is a plaintiff/defendant relationship
and/or when the defendant is aware of the plaintiffs emotional state.
Brandon only suggests that these principles are relevant to the discussion. One might imagine, for instance, an unknown passerby
crossing a street in downtown Omaha and directing such obscene and
abusive language at another that this language might fairly be held
"extreme and outrageous." Brandon certainly does not preclude such
a result.
While the court's reasoning in Brandon gives at least some suggestion that "crude and dehumanizing" language might not so readily be
"extreme and outrageous" in all circumstances, Brandon is not as
helpful in indicating precisely what kind of language, aside from
Laux's, might cause the court to exclaim, "Outrageous!" That is, even
if there were both a relationship between the parties analogous to that
in Brandon and the defendant was aware of the plaintiffs emotional
vulnerabilities when engaging in language-based conduct, as in Brandon, the limits as to just what kind of language might be "extreme and
outrageous" for the purposes of future IIED claims remain elusive.
It remains unclear, for example, how the Nebraska Supreme Court
would treat one's calling another a "damned fat fag"10 6 or how the
court would deal with one's speaking of and telling jokes about the
size of a man's penis.10 7 Other courts have found such language not to
be "extreme and outrageous." In other words, the balance between
"rough language" and "extreme and outrageous" language is hardly
certain. From a Nebraska practitioner's standpoint, one must simply
work from and with the language-based conduct in Brandon, making
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Brandon, 261 Neb. at 643, 624 N.W.2d at 613.
Id.
Id. at 644, 624 N.W.2d at 613.
See King v. Burris, 588 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1984) (applying Florida law).
See Wood v. Topeka Hous. Auth., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Kan. 2000), amended on
other grounds by 2000 WL 554176 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2000).
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analogies accordingly. Striking a meaningful balance between "rough
language" and "extreme and outrageous" language cannot be done until future language-based IIED claims are fully litigated.
One might, at any rate, predict that the court will not stray too far
from section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts when future language-based IIED claims are brought before it. With the arguable exception of its likely disproportionate focus on a defendant's tone of
voice, the court has largely adhered to the Restatement and has given
no serious indication that it seeks to devise or apply any fundamentally different standard for recovery. The court continues to remain
mindful of the Restatement's suggestion against permitting recovery
for mere "rough language."os The court, therefore, is most unlikely to
be too quick to deem just any language "extreme and outrageous."
And thus, the Nebraska defense lawyer's delight is the Nebraska
plaintiffs' lawyer's disappointment: Nebraska's path down any slippery slope is probably a short one.
V.

CONCLUSION

Brandon ex rel. Estate of Brandon v. County of Richardson may
well be comparatively liberal with respect to past Nebraska IIED
cases. Nonetheless, Brandon is still overwhelmingly in keeping with
the standards and recommendations of section 46 of the Restatement,
the IIED standard long used by the Nebraska Supreme Court. Accordingly, Brandon sheds light on the Nebraska Supreme Court's
(more or less) consistent, or stable, approach to IIED claims and to the
"extreme and outrageous conduct" necessary for a plaintiffs legal recovery for IIED.
The Brandon court continued to utilize section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, emphasizing Laux's position of authority and
Laux's knowledge of Brandon's emotional disposition. While apparently never before done by the Nebraska Supreme Court, recovery for
a defendant's language-based conduct is completely permissible under
section 46, which recognizes IIED as an independent tort; thus, the
court's finding that Laux's conduct was "extreme and outrageous" is
no anomaly. Further, the court's finding that Laux's conduct was "extreme and outrageous" as a matter of law is also permitted under the
standards of section 46. So long as the court continues to remain
aware of the Restatement's warning against allowing recovery for
mere "rough language"-which, thus far, it has-the court is not too
likely to quickly slide down a slippery slope whereby legal recovery in
tort suddenly becomes available for all sorts of language-based conduct. In short, the application of section 46 remains strong in
Nebraska.
108. See Brandon, 261 Neb. at 657, 624 N.W.2d at 621.
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To assure that section 46 continues to serve as Nebraska's standard of legal recovery for IIED, the court must take care to avoid placing undue emphasis on factors that arguably fall outside of the section
46 framework for the purposes of finding conduct "extreme and outrageous" in future IIED claims brought before it. Among these factors is
the nature of a defendant's tone of voice. Insofar as Brandon does not
indicate that the nature of a defendant's tone of voice alone would be a
sufficient basis for a claim for IIED, the court's focus on these kinds of
factors thus far has been minimal. If the court wishes to maintain any
reasonable and meaningful standard of recovery for IIED, it must not
stray further.
Yet, one might argue that an emphasis of any kind-no matter
how minimal-on factors such as the defendant's tone of voice for the
purposes of finding conduct "extreme and outrageous" is misplaced
and inappropriate. After all, the court's more-than-nominal emphasis
on Laux's tone of voice may have already set an unwise precedent
from a practical, or systemic, standpoint. Given the court's obvious
willingness to now consider a defendant's tone of voice as a prominent
factor in the calculus of "extreme and outrageous conduct," even if the
court has not fallen prey to a slippery slope of "extreme and outrageous conduct," it is not difficult to imagine plaintiffs at least attempting to more readily litigate IIED claims. By placing such emphasis on
a defendant's tone of voice, the court, in effect, may have opened the
doors of Nebraska's courts to plaintiffs seeking legal redress because
they did not appreciate the manner in which they were spoken to. It is
ultimately uncertain just how far beyond filing a petition these plaintiffs might get, but Brandon at least suggests that they might well go
further than any pre-Brandon plaintiffs ever dreamt.1o 9
Matthew M. Munderloh
109. Of course, even if a plaintiffs IED claim based solely on a defendant's use of a
particular tone of voice should survive a demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or a later motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff must eventually bear the burden of proving, or at least substantiating, the defendant's "extreme and outrageous conduct." This would be no easy
task. From a practical standpoint, one might imagine that the precise nature of a
defendant's tone of voice is very difficult to prove, or substantiate, absent a taperecording like that available in Brandon.
On the one hand, this heavy, if not nearly impossible, burden of proof might
work to alleviate the systemic concerns that seem to arise from the court's focus
on a defendant's tone of voice for the purposes of finding "extreme and outrageous
conduct." This burden of proof might discourage more litigious plaintiffs from
bringing IED claims whose merits are somewhat questionable.
On the other hand, there may be plaintiffs (or would-be plaintiffs) who were in
fact subjected to a truly "extreme and outrageous" tone of voice, whatever that
may be. For a suggestion, see supra note 95. With the exception of those who
were fortunate enough to have tape-recorded such a tone of voice, they too will
find it nearly impossible to bear the burden of proving or substantiating with any
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meaningful degree of credibility the "extreme and outrageous conduct," in which
case the court's focus on a defendant's tone of voice seems to give but a virtually
meaningless tool to those few plaintiffs who might in good faith be able to use it.

